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Using artificially synthesized stimuli, previous research has shown that cotton-top tamarin 
monkeys easily learn simple AB grammar sequences, but not the more complex AnBn 
sequences that require hierarchical structure. Humans have no trouble learning AnBn 
combinations. A more recent study, using similar artificially created stimuli, showed that 
there is a neuroanatomical difference in the brain between these two kinds of arrays. While 
the simpler AB sequences recruit the frontal operculum, the AnBn array recruits the 
phylogenetically newer Broca’s area. We propose that on close inspection, reported vocal 
repertoires of Old World Monkeys show that these nonhuman primates are capable of 
calls that have two items in them, but never more than two. These are simple AB 
sequences, as predicted by previous research. In addition, we suggest the two-item call 
cannot be the result of a combinatorial operation that we see in human language, where 
the recursive operation of Merge allows for a potentially infinite array of structures. In our 
view, the two-item calls of nonhuman primates result from a dual-compartment frame 
into which each of the calls can fit without having to be combined by an operation such 
as Merge.
Keywords: language evolution, primate calls, call combinations, merge, Chomsky hierarchy
INTRODUCTION
How did human language arise in evolution? To begin to answer this question, we  must first 
decide what precisely we  mean by language. Recently, Chomsky and others (Chomsky, 1995; 
Hauser et  al., 2002) have proposed a characterization of language in which the core of the 
language faculty is composed of a computational system that contains one operation, Merge, 
which takes two syntactic objects and puts them together to form a set, {a, b}. For example, 
if blue is a and book is b, the output of Merge that operates on a and b would be  {blue, 
book}. This output could in turn function as the input to another application of Merge, giving 
rise to the set {the, {blue, book}}. Much of syntax arises from this operation applying under 
a general requirement for computational efficiency, such as minimal search domain for Merge 
to combine a and b; this view of language is called the Strong Minimalist Thesis (SMT), and 
more recently, it has been referred to as the “Basic Property” of human language (Chomsky, 
2000, 2013, 2016; Berwick et  al., 2013; Berwick and Chomsky, 2016). As an example of 
computational efficiency, if {blue, book} serves as an input to Merge, the operation would 
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select the closest object, which is the set itself, instead of 
prying into the inner structure of the set to pick blue or book. 
The recursive application of Merge gives rise to unbounded 
structured phrases, furnishing human language with the potential 
to generate an infinite array.
In contrast to the kind of view based on SMT, some scholars 
suggest that human language is primarily a culturally evolved 
system or a product of intensive gene-culture coevolution 
(Tomasello, 1996, 2000; Laland et  al., 2000; Enfield and 
Levinson, 2006; Evans and Levinson, 2009; Chater and 
Christiansen, 2010; Azumagakito et  al., 2018; Laland, 2018). 
According to this view, human language development relies 
predominantly on cultural learning skills, rather than on a 
set of categories predetermined by an innately-specified universal 
grammar, as Chomsky argues (Chomsky, 1980, 1981, 1988, 
2007). We  believe that there are aspects of language and 
evolution that would receive plausible explanation from a view 
that culture is central to the development and workings of 
language (e.g., the morphological variation we  observe across 
languages). However, in this article, in which we will compare 
the basic workings of nonhuman primate and human systems 
underlying vocal communication, we  believe that the SMT 
is the most appropriate theory of human language to use as 
a model against which to compare nonhuman primate alarm-
calling systems. Other approaches include the theory that 
deconstructing language involves layers and degrees of 
complexity and therefore rejects a single structure-building 
operation such as Merge (Fitch, 2017; Townsend et  al., 2018).
Often, scholars who adhere to the Merge + Computational 
efficiency view of language also suggest that the computational 
system that underlies language is unique to our species (Chomsky, 
1968, 1980, 1981, 1988, 2007; Bolhuis et  al., 2014). Note that 
this view of uniqueness is by no means entailed by the particular 
design of the computational system for human language; one 
could imagine other animals having a similar system, which 
complements recent assumptions (Townsend et  al., 2018)1. The 
belief that the human language computational system is unique 
to humans stems from the observation that we  do not find 
anything comparable to it in nonhuman primates or other 
animals (Hauser et  al., 2002; Fitch and Hauser, 2004; Berwick 
et al., 2011; Schlenker et al., 2016b). This observation sometimes 
gives rise to the idea that what we  find elsewhere in the 
animal world, such as the alarm calls of nonhuman primates, 
is so fundamentally distinct from human language that there 
are no meaningful commonalities between the systems 
1 In this article, we  put forth an incremental approach to the emergence of an 
infinite, recursive combinatorial system, in line with Townsend et  al.’s (2018) 
observations. Simple cases of compositionality, as seen in primate call combinations, 
are composed by means of a dual-compartment frame, which may have later 
served as an input to Merge. However, we  do not follow Townsend et  al. (2018) 
in assuming that (frozen) phrasal expressions are structureless (e.g., “duck and 
cover”), since there is evidence indicating that even simple words comprise a 
hierarchical structure (see Nobrega and Miyagawa, 2015). Thus, although the 
dual-compartment frame may have furnished the emergence of Merge, it possibly 
did not remain active for the formation of linguistic objects, as typically assumed 
by gradualist approaches (see Progovac, 2015). In our view, Merge —once 
available— was responsible for the derivation of any linguistic object, from 
words to sentences.
(Smith and Kirby, 2008; Fischer, 2010). An argument often 
given in favor of the uniqueness of human language has to 
do with utility. One aspect of this is the notion that the typical 
nonhuman primate systems exist for the purpose of 
communication. For example, an alarm call for a particular 
predator is viewed as coextensive with the reference to that 
predator, and functions to communicate a message to or alter 
the behavior of others in the habitat regarding the predator, 
and/or to deter the predator itself (Maynard Smith, 1965; 
Zuberbühler et al., 1999a,b; Seyfarth and Cheney, 2003; Owren 
et  al., 2010). In contrast, Zuberbühler et  al. (1997, 1999a,b) 
provide experimental evidence based on the vocal behavior 
of Diana monkeys (Cercopithecus diana diana) that the calls 
are suggestively mediated by some form of cognitive semantic 
representations of the predator.
Human language has two components, the inner system, 
which is the computational system characterized by SMT, and 
the interfaces to which the array of structured phrases is sent: 
the phonological form interface (PF), which interacts with a 
sensory-motor system, associated with the externalization of 
the expressions generated; and the logical form interface (LF), 
which interacts with a conceptual-intentional system, responsible 
for interpretation. The architecture of the human language 
faculty, according to this view, roughly follows the representation 
in Figure 1.
The inner nature of the SMT computational system has led 
scholars to speculate that the utility of this system is not for 
communication but to represent thought (Chomsky, 2011, 2013; 
Berwick and Chomsky, 2016; Huybregts, 2017). As for the 
interfaces, setting aside LF, PF gives output to what we  typically 
think of as language — the externalized form that is 
characteristically expressed by vocal means, although it could 
also be  signs or written characters (Chomsky, 1995). In this 
way, sound (PF) and meaning (LF and its cognitive extensions) 
are only indirectly related, being mediated by the syntactic 
phrases generated by Merge. This may differ from primate alarm 
calls, which were originally characterized as having a direct 
link between the sound and its referent (Seyfarth et  al., 1980b). 
However, further research shows this is by no means clear cut. 
There is evidence that acoustically distinct calls (a monkey alarm 
call and the corresponding predator vocalization) may elicit the 
same mental representation of the predator; thus, uncoupling 
the direct sound-referent link (Zuberbühler et  al., 1999a,b). 
Similarly, context and other as yet unknown factors, may play 
a role in the iconic or symbolic nature of primate alarm calls 
FIGURE 1 | The architecture of the human Faculty of Language.
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(Fischer and Hammerschmidt, 2001; Price et  al., 2015). 
For other relevant references, see, for example, Wich and de 
Vries (2006), Clay et al. (2015), and Scarantino and Clay (2014).
Despite the widespread belief that human language is unique 
to our species, with properties that are fundamentally different 
from systems found elsewhere in nature, a significant body of 
neuroscientific research on language has developed out of 
comparing human language with that of nonhuman primates. 
Fitch and Hauser (2004) showed that cotton-top tamarin monkeys 
are capable of learning the sequence (AB)n, which is based on 
a simple, regular grammar. But their ability to learn breaks 
down completely when exposed to the sequence AnBn, which 
is based on a formal grammar higher on the Chomsky Hierarchy 
(Chomsky, 1956) – what Fitch and Hauser term Phrase Structure 
Grammar, a combinatorial system that requires hierarchical 
relations that Merge would create in human language. Briefly, 
the experiment tested two groups of 10 tamarins, one for each 
grammar, on either a series of nonsense syllables with the 
simpler, (AB)n sequence, for example, “no li pa ba” with alternative 
male and female voices for each syllable, or with the more 
complex AnBn sequence, for example, “yo la pa do,” where the 
first two syllables were in the female voice and the last two 
in the male voice. A testing phase played back the following 
day, the same novel eight stimuli to both groups – four of 
which were consistent with (AB)n and four of which were 
consistent with AnBn. About 72% of monkeys attended to 
violations of the (AB)n sequences, but only 29% noticed violations 
to AnBn sequences, suggesting the monkeys could only learn 
the simpler, finite state grammar sequences. In contrast, humans 
have no problem learning both types of sequences.
Using experimental stimuli modeled on Fitch and Hauser’s 
experiment, Friederici et  al. (2006) showed that the more 
complex sequence, AnBn, activates the posterior portion of the 
Broca’s area (viz., Brodmann area 44) and also the frontal 
operculum. In contrast, the simpler sequence of (AB)n only 
activates the frontal operculum. The frontal operculum is a 
phylogenetically older part of the brain compared to the Broca’s 
area (Sanides, 1962), and one of its functions is apparently to 
create sequences of (AB) combinations (Friederici et al., 2006), 
which we  find both in monkeys (Sanides, 1962) and humans. 
On the other hand, the Broca’s area is a newer part of the 
brain compared to the frontal operculum. Studies have shown 
that each region has a unique functional, anatomical, and 
molecular brain architecture (Sanides, 1962; Amunts et  al., 
1999, 2010; Zilles and Amunts, 2009). For example, it is Broca’s 
region of the brain that is recruited for the more complex 
sequence-based Phrase Structure Grammar, which requires a 
hierarchical structure, and not the flat one we  see for AB. 
Given that Merge2 is responsible for creating hierarchical 
structures, it is possible to view the Broca’s area as giving 
human language its distinct uniqueness by furnishing this 
operation to generate structured hierarchical arrays (Zaccarella 
and Friederici, 2015). Nevertheless, we  acknowledge that other 
studies implicate the left anterior temporal lobe in human 
2 For discussion about Merge, against, and for see, for example, Everett (2005), 
Kershenbaum et  al. (2014), and Nevins et  al. (2009).
language combinatorial/hierarchical operations without mention 
of Broca’s area and the frontal operculum (Bemis and Pylkkänen, 
2011; Brennan and Pylkkänen, 2017). The field of human brain 
research remains contentious and a discussion of the various 
viewpoints is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, we focus 
on the comparative human and nonhuman primate ability to 
combine call/word units and rely on studies that investigate 
these phenomena.
We wish to pursue a question parallel to Fitch and Hauser 
(2004), Friederici et  al. (2006), namely, what is the difference 
between human and nonhuman primate systems that underlie 
communication? We  will closely look at the research on Old 
World monkeys such as the Diana monkeys, Campbell’s monkeys, 
and De Brazza’s monkeys, to see what their vocal behavior 
can tell us about the actual system that underlies the primate 
communication system. It is typically believed that alarm calls, 
which are one stereotypical verbal behavior of monkeys, are 
composed of acoustically distinct, isolated utterances of alarm, 
such as those calls given in response to leopard, eagle, and 
snake predators (Blumstein, 1999). They do not combine, for 
example, the calls they give to leopards and eagles to create 
a novel utterance. However, research on the Old World monkeys 
indicates that some species have what appears to be  a 
combinatorial system in which they can put together two 
independent items3. What we  will show, based on the analysis 
of the reported data, is that these monkeys indeed have a 
way to create a two-term expression. This is consistent with 
Fitch and Hauser’s finding that tamarins can learn AB sequences 
(Fitch and Hauser, 2004). Assuming this AB sequence to 
be associated with the frontal operculum, this is also consistent 
with the observation that the frontal operculum supports the 
combining of two elements in sequence, rather than building 
a hierarchical structure (Zaccarella and Friederici, 2015). In 
the systems utilized by monkeys, we  will see a specific way 
in which two elements can be  put together.
Looking across the systems underlying communication in 
human and nonhuman primates, we  observe that there are 
essentially three systems: one, two, and infinite. “One” refers 
to the well-known isolated alarm calls found across the primate 
world, especially observed in the alarm-calling system of vervet 
monkeys, while “infinite” refers to the infinite potential of the 
human language that is made possible by the recursive application 
of Merge. It is “two” that we  will look at carefully; we  will 
see that it is not based on any combinatorial system such as 
Merge, a point consistent with previous research. The question 
is, how is “two” made possible? The answer to this may hold 
a key to how Merge emerged in Homo sapiens.
3 A reviewer pointed out the work, Kershenbaum et  al. (2014), in which a 
wide range of animal vocal sequences, from birds to whales to primates, is 
studied, with the intent of testing to see if these calls, some of which are 
quite complex, can be  described as Markovian vocal calls, which would fit 
well within the Chomsky hierarchy. Their conclusion is that there are calls 
that may best be  described as non-Markovian. It is interesting that primate 
calls do not fall into the claimed non-Markovian calls; at this point, our 
understanding is that primate calls, such as the Old World Monkey calls we have 
studied, fall within the more traditional view of animal communication, which 
allows for description by a regular grammar.
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We begin with a brief discussion of the “one” system.
SYSTEM OF ONE
Several species of both Old and New World primates have 
what we  call here “isolated” alarm calls, meaning one 
stereotyped utterance elicited by a specific predator/threat 
in the environment. Examples include the now famous vervet 
monkey system, studied first by Struhsaker (1967), and then, 
in more detail, by Seyfarth et  al. (1980b). Vervet monkeys 
(Chlorocebus pygerythrus) give a distinct call when they see 
a leopard (“bark”), another when they see an eagle (“cough”), 
and a third when they encounter a snake (“chutter”). All 
three predators require distinct escape strategies and these 
calls, when experimentally played back to vervet groups, 
reliably elicit the appropriate reactions, even in the absence 
of the predator referent (Seyfarth et al., 1980a). Thus, scholars 
have concluded that these types of alarm calls should 
be  classified as “functionally referential” (Macedonia and 
Evans, 1993) functioning as if they carry referential “meaning” 
to other vervets. Similarly, tamarins (Saguinus fuscicollis and 
Saguinus mystax) have an aerial alarm call and a distinct 
terrestrial alarm call, which both elicit appropriate anti-
predatory behaviors (Kirchhof and Hammerschmidt, 2006). 
In both these cases, the alarm calls to different threat classes 
(aerial/terrestrial) or predators (eagle/snake/leopard) are 
acoustically distinct and are not combined to create calls 
relating to new referents or to carry new “meanings,” as far 
as we  are aware. It is of note that the vervet monkey system, 
which has recently been revisited (Price et  al., 2015), shows 
some intergradation between alarm calls and suggests contextual 
information, as well as pertinent acoustic cues, is important 
in determining a monkey’s behavioral response to alarm 
situations. Rather than absolutely discrete calls, these and 
probably other primates, are able to use similar call types 
more flexibly.
Functionally referential calls are not restricted to nonhuman 
primates in the animal kingdom. There are also at least six 
species of bird that use predator-specific alarm calls: Fowl, 
White-browned scrub wren, Siberian jay, Great tit, American 
robin, and Yellow warbler (reviewed in Gill and Bierema, 2013). 
Additionally, there are other mammals that use functionally 
referential calls, for example, Gunnison’s prairie dogs and 
domestic dogs (reviewed in Townsend and Manser, 2013). This 
suggests that the isolated alarm call may be  much older than 
the direct ancestor of modern primates, or it may have evolved 
more than once in evolutionary history.
Despite an apparent lack of combinatory alarm calls, many 
nonhuman primates exhibit regular variation within isolated 
call types that may be  used to convey different “meanings.” 
For example, red-fronted lemurs (Eulemur fulvus rufus) also 
rely on two alarm calls: a functionally referential call for 
aerial predators and a more generalized call for terrestrial 
predators and other ground disturbances. However, they vary 
the frequency and amplitude of their generalized terrestrial 
“woof ” alarm call. This variation corresponds to threat urgency, 
with experimentally increased frequency and amplitude eliciting 
a higher arousal state (Fichtel and Hammerschmidt, 2002). 
Among the apes, evidence for referential alarm calls is 
surprisingly sparse. However, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) 
produce different types or grades of “rough grunt” that allow 
listening conspecifics to determine which type of food has 
been discovered (Slocombe and Zuberbühler, 2005). In one 
study, apples (a low value food) elicited a rough grunt with 
low fundamental frequency, whereas bread (a high value 
food) elicited a rough grunt with high fundamental frequency 
(among other varying acoustic parameters). Acoustic differences 
between the two rough grunts were statistically significant. 
Gibbons (Hylobates lar) also have graded calls, known 
collectively as “hoos,” which subtly vary in context-specific 
ways (Clarke et  al., 2015). In both cases, imposed acoustic 
variation increases the utility of an isolated call and 
subsequently the vocal repertoire of the primates. Combining 
calls to form new meanings would increase the repertoire 
further, yet in many species evidence of this is lacking 
[chimpanzee pant-hoots may represent an example of a 
combined call but there is no evidence, as yet, that the 
constituent calls have independent “meanings” or that the 
entire sequence has a compound or new meaning (Zuberbühler, 
2018)]. The point is that primate call systems exist that do 
not combine call elements in order to convey changes in 
call meaning, thus potentially explaining the dearth of call 
combinations and subsequent lack of Merge found in many 
nonhuman primate systems.
SYSTEM OF TWO
If the system underlying nonhuman primate communication 
does not contain Merge, as suggested in the work of Fitch 
and Hauser (2004) and others, a natural conclusion to draw 
is that the system associated with these primates cannot combine 
elements but are limited to the System of One with only 
isolated calls. However, there is a body of research on Old 
World monkeys, particularly the Guenons (Cercopithecus) of 
Africa, that indicates that these monkeys are capable of vocal 
behavior in which two elements are combined to form a third 
call that has “meaning” distinct from its parts. Human language 
contains at least two combinatorial systems (a duality of 
patterning) – a simple phonological system and a compositional, 
semantic system. The crucial difference is that in the 
compositional system, combined elements have compound 
meanings, derived from their constituent elements and the 
way in which they are combined, whereas in the phonological 
system this is not the case. In language, combined elements 
can be inserted into other sequences (recursion) and according 
to Merge theory, only Merge can account for these hierarchical 
structures. Does the system underlying the communication of 
these Old World nonhuman primates contain something 
resembling Merge, contrary to prior research? We do not believe 
so. The crucial fact, as far as we  can determine, is that in 
every case, the combination is limited to two elements. One 
never finds a call made up of three or more parts to the call. 
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What we  suggest is that the system used by these monkeys 
contains a dual-compartment frame that allows them to acquire 
a two-part call. The two-part call is not the result of some 
combinatorial operation such as Merge, but rather, the nonhuman 
primate possesses this dual-compartment frame for creating 
utterances. Based on prior research, we  speculate that this 
dual-compartment frame is the basis for nonhuman primates 
being able to learn AB sequences easily (Fitch and Hauser, 
2004). Friederici et  al. (2006)’s study suggests that the dual-
compartment frame exists in the older part of the brain, in 
the frontal operculum, to allow nonhuman primates to learn 
AB sequences without the need of Merge, which in humans 
is in the Broca’s area4.
If the kind of analysis we  are proposing for nonhuman 
primate and human systems underlying communication is 
correct, it adds to the debate about the origin of human 
language. In particular, there are scholars who advocate 
that human language developed through a series of 
protolanguages, from one-word, to two-words, and so on 
(e.g., Bickerton, 1990, 1998; Jackendoff, 1999, 2002). In our 
view, there was a sharp cut-off between the two-word stage 
and the kind of system we  find in modern language that 
has the potential to generate an infinite array of structured 
phrases. Our ancestors, prior to developing Merge, simply 
recruited the same systems of one and two items that had 
developed in nonhuman primates. In principle, at this point, 
there was no difference between nonhuman and human 
vocal behavior. Once Merge developed, an entirely new 
system emerged that can recursively combine elements into 
an unbounded array of structured phrases, something we do 
not see in the nonhuman primate world. The only part of 
this new system that may have been inherited from the 
earlier system is binarity. It is well established that the 
structure of human language is binary (Kayne, 1984; Nowak 
et al., 2002; Toyota, 2012), and this property naturally arises 
from Merge that always combines two items. But why does 
Merge not combine three or more items? In principle, there 
is no reason why a combinatorial operation that creates a 
set of three {a, b, c} or more cannot be  conceived. But 
we  do not find this in human language, except possibly in 
highly special constructions such as conjunction. One 
possibility for the binary nature of human language comes 
from the dual-compartment frame that first developed in 
nonhuman primates. In this view, Merge emerged 
independently, but its input was furnished by the dual-
compartment frame of the older system. This may relate 
to an idea that Friederici proposes (Friederici, 2004, 2009; 
Friederici et  al., 2006) that the Broca’s area is involved in 
4 Our claim is that the Old World Monkey calls comprise a system that can 
be  described by regular grammar, and one that Friederici et  al. (2006) show 
as using the frontal operculum. This is the same conclusion as Fitch and 
Hauser (2004), but using the actual vocalization of the animals. This system, 
and the system in the phylogenetically newer Broca’s area that allows hierarchical 
structure, together comprise human language. It is possible to view both systems 
as having existed prior to the formation of human language; language simply 
tapped these pre-existing resources. In this way, language did not arise from 
primate alarm calls.
the processing of complex (hierarchical) syntax, while local 
syntactic structure building recruits the deep frontal 
operculum (see also Zaccarella and Friederici, 2015). In 
our analysis, the “local syntactic structure building” would 
be  based on the dual-compartment frame, whereas Merge 
in the Broca’s area is responsible for complex syntax building5.
In an earlier work, Progovac (2015) proposes what she calls 
a two-slot mold, primarily to account for certain kinds of 
two-word compounds, two-word sentences, and paratactic 
attachment of two clauses such as monkey see, monkey do, 
which she considers as reflecting a primitive stage of human 
language. While we  do not consider any combinations in 
modern human language to be  “living fossils” of an older era 
(Nobrega and Miyagawa, 2015), we acknowledge that Progovac 
earlier proposed the idea of the two-term frame as a “proto” 
stage of human language, an idea compatible with our dual-
compartment frame for monkeys.
It is worth noting here that nonhuman primate vocal 
systems may contain more call combinations than currently 
recognized. For example, some primate examples of the System 
of One may, on closer inspection, utilize a System of Two. 
One instance of this comes from the black-fronted titi monkey 
(Callicebus nigrifrons). A study published in 2012 showed 
that call A is given reliably to threats in the canopy, whereas 
call B is given to threats on the ground, and these calls are 
functionally referential (System of One) (Cäsar and Zuberbühler, 
2012). A follow up study published in 2013 showed that 
these monkeys combine A and B calls (in predator-specific 
ways) to signify, for example, an aerial predator on the ground 
or a terrestrial predator in the canopy (System of Two) (Casar 
et  al., 2013). An even closer look at the same titi monkeys’ 
combinations of A and B calls by Berthet et al. (2019) reveals 
more complexity. While the predator type seems more important 
than its location, both are revealed in the call combinations, 
particularly by the proportion of “BB-grams” (the proportion 
of two contiguous B calls). The authors suggest that the 
information is continuous rather than categorical and has 
elements of probabilistic meaning. In terms of our theory, 
the BB-grams would take up one slot (Bn) in the dual 
compartment frame and the other would be  taken up by 
the A calls (An), still fulfilling the System of Two requirements. 
However, this example illustrates how the flexibility of monkey 
call combinations can still be  expressed via the dual 
compartment frame theory. Further research is needed to 
shed light on how other monkeys produce and attend to 
their call combinations.
5 A reviewer wonders how our theory based in part on Merge compares to 
alternative views such as that of Lieberman (2015, 2016). Lieberman 
argues that hierarchical syntactic structures cannot be considered the product 
of a genetically determined, species-specific operation. According to his 
view, hierarchical structures may be  acquired by means of associative 
motor learning, similarly to learning how to walk. If his assumption is on 
the right track, one should expect that the type of structural embedding 
observed in natural languages is arbitrarily determined—a point that is not 
addressed by the author—even though it is patently uniform across the 
species. Languages do vary in terms of lexical items and superficial 
distribution, but they do not vary with respect to the nature of sequences 
it can generate.
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ANALYSES OF OLD WORLD  
MONKEY CALLS
We begin our analyses with the putty-nosed monkey 
(Cercopithecus nictitans), where we  develop the idea of the 
dual-compartment frame for nonhuman primates. We will then 
apply this to some other Old World monkeys that also evidence 
a two-term combination.
Putty-Nosed Monkey
Putty-nosed monkeys have two main alarm calls, pyows (=P), 
which are broadly distributed and suggestive of a general 
alarm call, and hacks (=H), which are often used to indicate 
eagles (Arnold and Zuberbühler, 2012). In addition, the putty-
nosed monkeys sometimes produce pyow-hack sequences 
composed of a small number of pyows followed by a small 
number of hacks. Unlike the individual pyows and hacks, 
which are alarm calls made in response to a perceived predator, 
the pyow-hack sequences are apparently predictive of group 
movement. The length of the sequence is statistically related 
to the distance traveled. In a series of playback experiments, 
Arnold and Zuberbühler (2006a,b, 2008, 2012, 2013) showed 
that it is the length of the overall sequence that is predictive 
of the distance traveled, and the actual composition of the 
equal-length sequences did not appear to affect the behavior. 
Thus, comparative behavioral results were obtained when 
PPPHHH, PHHHHH, and other P-H combinations of the 
same length were played back.
What we  see here, as Schlenker et  al. (2016a) notes, is that 
the various pyow-hack sequences of the same length are 
phonologically complex, but lexically simple. They are 
phonologically complex because of the multitude of possibilities 
for the occurrence of pyows and hacks. But the sequence is 
lexically simple because regardless of the actual number of 
pyows and hacks, the sequence is apparently associated with 
comparable behavior — the distance traveled is essentially the 
same. How can we  capture both the phonological complexity 
and the lexical simplicity of these sequences? When one looks 
at the various possibilities, there are two compartments, one 
for pyows and the other for hacks (Figure 2).
Within each compartment, one can have a varying number 
of pyows and a varying number of hacks. Crucially, one never 
finds a sequence that alternates between the two, such as 
PHPH… (Arnold and Zuberbühler, 2012). We  would not 
expect such an alternation because it would require more 
than two compartments. So the pyow-hack sequence must 
always fit into a dual-compartment paradigm, with the only 
variable being the length of the overall sequence as dictated 
by the number of pyows and hacks. We  suggest that this 
dual-compartment frame, which Progovac (2015) earlier 
proposed as “two-slot mold” for an ostensible human 
protolanguage, is responsible for what roughly appears to 
be a combinatorial process of word building in these monkeys. 
Crucially, there is no operator that operates on each term 
and combines them, as would be  the case if Merge were 
available. This is clearly seen by the varying numbers of 
pyows and hacks that, despite the variation, form a unified 
expression with the same “meaning.” If some combinatorial 
operation were involved, we  would need to say that this 
operation would take each instance of pyow and each instance 
of hack and combine them into some expression, but it is 
not clear what the structure of such an expression would 
be, nor is it clear how such combinatorial operations could 
predict that the overall meaning is the same regardless of 
the number of individual items in the call.
Campbell’s Monkey
Ouattara et  al. (2009b) reports on a study of adult males of 
six wild groups in the Tai Forest of Cote d’Ivoire. A striking 
property of the alarm calls of these monkeys is what Ouattara 
et  al. call affixation, where an acoustically invariable “suffix” 
attaches to acoustically variable “stems.” Let us start by looking 
at the alarm calls of Campbell’s monkeys (Cercopithecus campbelli) 
(Table 1).
We will focus on four of these calls, krak, hok, and their 
“affixed” versions, krak-oo and hok-oo. Ouattara et  al. (2009b), 
see also (Ouattara et  al., 2009a; Schlenker et  al., 2016a), note 
that the “affix” oo attaches to a stem to “broaden the call’s 
meaning.” In the case of hok-oo, the stem hok is a specific 
eagle alarm, while the affixed version is a general arboreal 
disturbance call. For krak-oo, the stem krak is a leopard alarm 
call while the affixed version is a general alert call. By calling 
oo an “affix,” Ouattara et  al. (2009b) as well as Schlenker et  al. 
(2016a) implicitly assume an operation by which oo is attached 
to a stem with some predictable semantic effect (see Schlenker 
FIGURE 2 | Dual-compartment frame proposed for putty-nosed monkey 
alarm calls.
TABLE 1 | Alarm calls of Campbell’s monkeys. Adapted from data in Ouattara 
et al. (2009b).
Call Context
boom Given in non-predatory cases, such as 
a falling branch
hok Given when a crowned eagle is 
detected
krak Given when detecting a leopard
hok-oo Given to disturbances in the canopy, 
hence a general aerial call
krak-oo Given to almost any disturbance
wak-oo Given to the same events as hok-oo 
calls (eagles, etc.)
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et al., 2016a for a detailed semantic/pragmatic analysis, including 
dialects of Campbell’s monkey calls).
However, an equally plausible way to view these alarm calls 
is that they are learned as independent, whole calls, and the 
phonological and semantic resemblances we  see with oo are 
entirely accidental. This would be  consistent with the idea that 
Merge does not exist in the system underlying monkey 
communication, and is supported by data showing that the 
oo affix is produced as an independent articulation rather than 
a co-articulation (Kuhn et  al., 2018). So which is it? Does 
Merge or some such operation exist in Campbell’s monkey 
system to operate on a stem and affix and combine them, or 
are these alarms simply learned as they are without any 
composition involved? We  will carefully sift through the data 
(Ouattara et  al., 2009b) in order to show that the Campbell’s 
monkey seems to be aware that in the call krak-oo, krak stands 
for leopard despite the fact that the overall call, krak-oo, is a 
general alarm call. But this does not entail the existence of 
a combinatorial operation such as Merge; we  will argue when 
we  look at the developmental data of De Brazza’s monkeys 
(Cercopithecus neglectus), which has a similar system as Campbell’s 
monkeys, that the calls appear to be learned as whole expressions 
even when there appears to be  an affix, but at the same time, 
the monkey seems aware that there are parts of calls that 
carry meaning independent of the entire call. This way of 
looking at the “affixed” calls parallels what we  saw for putty-
nosed monkeys. The system that we identified for these monkeys 
has a dual-compartment frame, with each slot being populated 
by one or more of the same call, pyow or hack.
In order to show that Campbell’s monkeys are aware that 
krak-oo contains krak that signifies a leopard, we need to carefully 
sift through Ouattara et  al.’s data (Ouattara et  al., 2009b), and 
extract from it data that is most widely distributed among the 
population studied. In one experiment, the researchers presented 
both visual (model) and acoustic cues of eagle and leopard to 
the monkeys in their natural habitat. Focusing on the alarms 
elicited by the visual cue first, we  find the following (Table 2).
For eagle, the call specific to eagles, hok, was most numerous, 
but there were also hok-oo, which is a general arboreal call, 
and krak-oo, which is a general call. For the leopard visual 
cue, krak, which is the leopard call, is the call given. There 
were four krak-oo calls, given by just one of the seven animals, 
whereas the other calls were distributed across virtually all of 
the animals under study. We  therefore believe that these four 
krak-oo calls are atypical and can be  excluded, so that what 
we  have is the following (Table 3).
As shown by the rectangle, there is a gap in the paradigm. 
Why did not all seven animals give out krak-oo when presented 
with a leopard when this call is a general call that would 
be  appropriate for this context? We  can see that for eagle, the 
monkeys gave out this general call in large numbers. A plausible 
explanation lies in the fact that krak-oo contains the form 
krak, which is the leopard alarm call. When faced with a 
leopard, the monkeys overwhelmingly chose to use krak instead 
of krak-oo because krak-oo, despite being a general call, 
nevertheless contains krak and apparently a residue of the 
meaning of leopard associated with it. Faced with a leopard 
in the vicinity, the Campbell’s monkey chose the more direct 
way to convey the alarm by choosing krak instead of 
krak-oo.
According to Schlenker et  al. (2016a,b), the Informativity 
Principle is: “when one call is strictly more informative than 
another, the most informative one is used whenever possible” 
(p.  18). We  can adapt and apply this to the Campbell’s 
monkey call system to get: “when two alarm calls contain 
reference to the same predator, the more informative one 
is used whenever possible.” The fact that this principle excludes 
krak-oo when presented with a leopard model suggests that 
the Campbell’s monkeys are aware that this expression is 
composed of two parts (and was not learned as an unanalyzable 
unit). This also explains why, when presented with an eagle 
model, the Campbell’s monkeys used both hok-, for eagle, 
and krak-oo, the general call; the latter does not contain 
any reference to the eagle, so it is not excluded by the 
revised Informativity Principle. There is a question as to 
why the Campbell’s monkeys also produced hok-oo when 
presented with the eagle model. This should be  excluded by 
the Informativity Principle in favor of hok-. One possible 
explanation lies in the observation that hok-oo appears to 
have additional functions beyond hok- and is associated with 
distinctive behavior: “[w]hile producing “hok-oo” calls, males 
adopted a threat posture, combined with flashing their eyelids, 
and they sometimes conducted a short dash toward the 
disturbance” (Ouattara et  al., 2009b:3).
The question still remains as to how the Campbell’s monkey 
learns krak-oo. Is it by affixation, as previous research suggests, 
or is it learned as a whole expression, but fitting into the 
dual-compartment frame as we  saw for the system entailed 
for the putty-nosed monkey? The data available for Campbell’s 
monkeys do not help us to decide, but when we  look at De 
Brazza’s monkey system (described later), which has calls similar 
to that of Campbell’s monkeys, we  find evidence that there 
is no combinatorial operation involved during development, 
but rather, the two items in a call fit into a dual-
compartment frame.
If we  look now at the Campbell’s monkey calls elicited by 
acoustic cues, we  get a very different result (Table 4).
TABLE 2 | Number of call responses to visual predators by Campbell’s 
monkeys. Adapted from data in Ouattara et al. (2009b).
krak-oo krak hok-oo hok
Eaglevisual 91 37 151
Leopardvisual 4 273
TABLE 3 | Number of call responses to visual predators by Campbell’s 
monkeys, excluding possible outliers.
krak-oo krak hok-oo hok
Eaglevisual 91 37 151
Leopardvisual
273
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Let us exclude the two small instances, seven for hok-oo, 
which were elicited by just three out of the seven animals, 
and nine for hok, elicited from just two of seven animals. In 
addition, the 42 instances of krak were elicited from four out 
of seven animals, and of these four animals, two of them 
were responsible for 33 calls, or close to 80% of the total 
number of krak calls. If we  temporarily exclude these 42 
instances, we  get the following (Table 5).
What we  can see is that contrary to the visual cues, the 
monkeys reacted to acoustic cues with uncertainty, thus they 
consistently and overwhelmingly used the most general alarm 
call regardless of the acoustic cue they heard. One explanation 
is that acoustic playbacks may be  weaker experimental stimuli 
than visual models due to them being short-lived, and impossible 
to confirm, especially if a function of alarm calling is to deter 
the predator (Arnold et  al., 2008). Thus acoustic predator cues 
may make for uncertain/non-uniform responses. Another 
possibility is that a vocalizing predator is unlikely to be hunting, 
and therefore does not represent as great a threat as a silent, 
but visualized predator. For most of the population, then, using 
the direct call, such as hok for eagle and krak for leopard, 
requires visual witnessing of the predator. The exception to 
this were the two animals that elicited a large number of krak 
calls in response to the acoustic leopard cue, which we excluded 
in Table 5, but will return to now. It is not clear why these 
animals apparently showed more certainty about the presence 
of a predator than the others. These individuals were perhaps 
either more (or less) naïve than their counterparts about leopard 
hunting strategies.
Black-and-White Colobus Monkeys
Similar to the above examples, Schel et  al. (2009, 2010) report 
on Black-and-White Colobus monkeys (Colobus polykomos and 
Colobus guereza) that have calls which fit the two-compartment 
frame. These monkeys have three types of calls, snorts, roaring 
sequences, made of a series of roars, and a snort-roar sequence. 
The single snort is typically used for terrestrial predator contexts 
(not eagles), repetition of roars for leopard and eagle-related 
situations (with significant structural differences between the 
two), and the snort-roar sequence appears most often related 
to leopards. For the two-compartment frame, we  propose the 
first compartment contains snort, which is never repeated, and 
the second compartment contains a roaring sequence.
De Brazza’s Monkeys
Bouchet et al. (2012) studied 23 De Brazza monkeys (Cercopithecus 
neglectus) in captivity that included three juvenile males, three 
juvenile females, five adult males, and 12 adult females, all 
captive-born. The inclusion of the juvenile monkeys allowed 
for developmental study of calls, which becomes important for 
our study. They report that the monkeys produced 10 distinct 
call types; we  will focus on three of them, On, I, and OnI 
since the first two together represent the third. Though the 
De Brazza study described here does not focus on alarm calls, 
like our other examples, it highlights the ontogeny of a combined 
call system in an Old World monkey, which is pertinent to 
our theory that Merge is not necessary for combining two calls.
On calls occurred with gazes directed to the adult male by 
adult females as well as both sexes of juveniles. The adult 
male made this call when gazing at zoo-keepers, the research 
observer, or neighboring groups. I calls were uttered by juveniles 
when approaching the adult male to establish physical contact. 
OnI calls were made by adult females and juveniles of both 
sexes when approaching a male but with ambivalence about 
whether to approach or escape. The distribution of these calls 
among juveniles and adults is given below (Table 6).
On occurs with both juvenile and adult females and males, 
while I occurs only with juveniles of both sexes. OnI occurs 
with female and male juveniles and with female adults.
Let us turn to the question of whether the two-item OnI 
is a product of a combinatorial operation or is learned whole 
but fit into a dual-compartment frame. Among juveniles of 
both sexes we  find On, I, and OnI; OnI here could be  viewed 
as resulting from a combinatorial process. However, when 
we  look at the adult female, we  see a clear indication that 
OnI cannot be  the result of an operation that combined On 
and I. This is because among females, On occurs but I does 
not, yet OnI does occur. It is important to note that as juveniles, 
the females produced both On and I as well as OnI, hence 
there is presumably awareness that the OnI utterance has parts 
that fit into the whole. Our suggestion is that this fitting the 
parts into the whole is made possible by the kind of dual-
compartment frame we  argued for the putty-nosed monkey 
system. Although I is lost in the adult vocal repertoire, presumably 
the dual-compartment frame structure holds for the adult OnI. 
Crucially, the two-term call OnI is not the product of a 
combinatorial operation such as Merge.
TABLE 5 | Number of call responses to acoustic predator cues by Campbell’s 
monkeys, excluding possible outliers.
krak-oo krak hok-oo hok
Eagleacoustic 62
Leopardacoustic 67
TABLE 6 | Distribution of three call types across age and sex in DeBrazza’s 
monkeys. Adapted from data in Bouchet et al. (2012).
Females Males
Juveniles Adults Juveniles Adults
On On On On
I I
OnI OnI OnI
TABLE 4 | Number of call responses to acoustic predator cues by Campbell’s 
monkeys. Adapted from data in Ouattara et al. (2009b).
krak-oo krak hok-oo hok
Eagleacoustic 62 7 (3/7) 9 (2/7)
Leopardacoustic 67 42 (4/7)
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Previous research showed that there is a fundamental difference 
between AB combinations and more complex AnBn combinations 
that require hierarchy. Cotton-top tamarins and very young human 
infants can only compute the simple AB combinations, while 
humans, after a certain age, can learn the more complex array 
easily (Fitch and Hauser, 2004; Milne et  al., 2016). Experiments 
by Friederici et al. (2006) showed that there is a neuroanatomical 
distinction between AB sequences and AnBn. While the former 
recruits the frontal operculum, the latter recruits, in addition, 
the phylogenetically newer Broca’s area. These experiments on 
tamarins and on human subjects were conducted with artificially 
created stimuli. We  studied the vocal repertoire of Old World 
monkeys, and found that their calls were limited at most to a 
combination of two items. We  argue this is equivalent to the AB 
sequence identified earlier using artificial stimuli. What we  can 
deduct from this is that nonhuman primates likely recruit the 
frontal operculum to create a dual-compartment frame which 
allows up to two-term calls, but no more, as predicted by previous 
research. In contrast, humans tap the combinatorial operation of 
Merge in the Broca’s area to create a potentially infinite array of 
hierarchical structures. As far as we  can tell, there is currently 
no evidence for Merge in nonhuman primate combined calls.
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